COLONEL (P) JAMES E. CHAMBERS

Colonel James E. Chambers hails from Marietta, Oklahoma. He graduated in 1975 from Southeastern Oklahoma State University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Education. He taught school in Oklahoma from 1975 until he entered the U.S. Army in July 1978. He received an OCS Commission as an Air Defense Artillery Officer in 1979 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

After attending the ADA Officers' Basic Course at Fort Bliss, Texas, he was assigned as a Redeye Section Leader and Support Platoon Leader in HHC, 4/9 Squadron, 6th Air Cavalry Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas. In 1981, he branch transferred to the Transportation Corps and attended the Transportation Officers' Advanced Course at Fort Eustis, VA. He was then assigned to Panama as the S4, 193d Separate Infantry Brigade, and subsequently commanded the 475th Light Medium Truck Company. He finished his tour as Support Operations Officer, 324th Support Group.
In 1986, Colonel Chambers attended the Logistics Executive Development Course at Fort Lee, VA, and earned a Master's Degree in Logistics Management. He was then assigned (1987-1989) as a Combat Development Officer, U.S. Army Space Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After completing the Command and General Staff College in 1990, he was assigned to the 3d Infantry Division as the Division Transportation Officer (DTO). He deployed with the VII Corps as a G3 Plans Office during Desert Storm and redeployed in June 1991. From 1991 to 1993, he was assigned as the Battalion S-3 and Executive Officer of the 703rd Main Support Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division in Kitzingen, Germany.

Colonel Chambers performed joint duty with the U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base Illinois, and in 1995 took command of the 27th Main Support Battalion, First Calvary Division, Fort Hood, Texas. Upon completion of battalion command in 1997, he assumed duty as the Deputy Group Commander, 7th Transportation Group, Fort Eustis, Virginia. After completing the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1999, he assumed the position of USAREUR DCSLOG Maintenance Division Chief. He then commanded the 7th Corps Support Group, III COSCOM from 2000-2002, and currently is the XO to the Army G4. He will assume command of the 13th COSCOM, Fort Hood, Texas on 18 July, 2003.

His decorations include the, Bronze Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal.

He has been married 29 years to Elaine and they have two sons, Chris, 26 and Kyle, 23.

NDIA SYMPOSIUM

Emerging Lessons From Operation Iraqi Freedom

24 June 2003

COL (P) James Chambers
Army G-4



Richard Lewis, Associated Press

"I'm certain that when the history of this campaign is written that people will look at this move that the land forces have made in this amount of time as being *not only a great military accomplishment, but an incredible logistics accomplishment*."

LTG John Abizaid
Deputy Commander (Forward)
Combined Forces Command, CENTCOM
31 March 2003

A HERCULEAN EFFORT

LOGISTICIANS IN OIF….

- ✓ Delivered enough MREs to feed the entire town of Spokane, Washington for over a year
- ✓ Moved 9,000+ Major End Items to SWA; a convoy that would stretch from Detroit to St. Louis
- ✓ Provided 15 Million Gallons of Fuel Daily; About Same Consumption as Entire State of Florida in One Day
- ✓ Provided an average of 2.1M gallons of drinking water each day to 307K troops; enough to fill 139 backyard swimming pools
- ✓ Shipped 367,834 tons of ammo (1.065 billion items)

No Operational Limits Imposed By Logistics

EMERGING LESSONS FROM OIF

- **Evaluating Systems / Doctrine**
  - ✓ Logistics Common Operating Picture
  - ✓ Contractors on the Battlefield
  - ✓ Sustainment
- **Re-Thinking Assumptions**
  - ✓ Force Protection for CSS units
  - ✓ Utilization of RC
  - ✓ How We Deploy
- **What Applies to Future Conflicts?**

EVALUATING SYSTEMS

LOGISTICS COMMON OPERATING PICTURE

Objective: Maintaining visibility of the location of critical supplies and equipment

- **In-Transit Visibility**
  - ✓**CFLCC policy: radio frequency tags applied to all supplies and equipment**
  - ✓ **APODs / SPODs / SSAs instrumented with interrogators that read RFID technology**
- **End to End distribution: tailored, configured loads - "factory to foxhole**
- **Blue Force Tracking**

Movement Tracking System

Radio Frequency Tag

EVALUATING DOCTRINE

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

- SECURITY
- GOV'T CONTRACT LAW vs. UCMJ
- LOCALLY-HIRED OR DEPLOY W/ UNITS
- COMMAND & CONTROL vs. MANAGEMENT
- FORCE PROTECTION
- GREATER RISK = GREATER COST
- CONTRACTOR STATUS: COMBATANT OR NON-COMBATANT
- CONTRACTORS AS RESERVISTS
- LIFE SUPPORT
- LOCATION IN COMBAT ZONE

✓ **Policies regarding contractors on the battlefield (weapons systems contractors vs. contingency contractors vs. sustainment contractors)**

✓ **Accounting and tracking of all contractors**



Michael Rene Pouliot

EVALUATING DOCTRINE

SUSTAINMENT

Largest Deployment of Force Provider in Army History

- **Force Provider**
  - ✓ Mass deployment of Force Provider equipment in OEF and OIF
  - ✓ May require a change in doctrine and force structure

- **Bottled Water**
  - ✓ Dependency on bottled water: (30% of distribution requirement even though bulk water was available)
  - ✓ Effect on Ground Transportation: (constrained trans assets affected the distribution and integrity of palletized Class IX)

EVALUATING DOCTRINE

SUSTAINMENT

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technolog (JSLIST)

BA 5590 - Batteries

Spares

Desert Camouflage Uniform – DCU's

Large Area Maintenance Shelter (LAMS)

Ammunition

Individual Body Armor (IBA)

RE-THINKING ASSUMPTIONS

FORCE PROTECTION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- **Weapons**
  - ✓ Authorizations for Crew Served Weapons
  - ✓ Familiarization and Qualification Ammo Allocation
- **Equipment** (NVGs, PLGRs)
- **Training** (MOS and Tactical)

What are the consequences of unsecured LOCs?

RE-THINKING ASSUMPTIONS

RELIANCE ON THE RESERVE COMPONENT

CHALLENGE ***Over 70% of all EAD CSS is in Reserve Component***



	UNITS	AUTH	
AC	607	51,989	26.5%
ARNG	580	57,594	29%
USAR	1078	87,385	44.5%
TOTAL	2265	196,968	100.0%

DISCUSSION

- ✓ **RC (particularly theater-level logistics) must be mobilized early**
- ✓ **RC OPTEMPO (what can be sustained? – emerging policy is one 270-day deployment / 60 months)**
- ✓ **SecDef directed "Reserve Component Comprehensive Review" intended to reduce reliance on RC early in operations (first Major Combat Operation (MCO) totally active component??)**

* Source: SAMAS AUG 02 Master Force File

RE-THINKING ASSUMPTIONS

DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

CHALLENGE ***Incremental approval of deployment orders and port accessibility issues resulted in changes to TPFDD flow***

***TPFDD – Time Phased Force Deployment Document**

DISAGGREGATION OF TPFDD

- ✓ **Movement of personnel through mobilization sites**
- ✓ **Challenge in processing soldiers / DA civilians / contractors at CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) and preparing for onward movement**
- ✓ **Maintenance of unit integrity (combat loading)**
- ✓ **Enabling units arriving after combat units**
- ✓ **Challenge in matching arriving equipment with mobilizing / arriving soldiers**

RE-THINKING ASSUMPTIONS

ACCESSIBILITY

CHALLENGES ***Northern ports lacked depth, which required smaller, slower, shallower draft ships AND "Anti-access" always implied "hostile", must also consider <u>diplomatic</u> and <u>bureaucratic</u> anti-access***

ISB / TSV

DISCUSSION

- ✓ **12 LMSRs to move 101st AA Division with enablers vs. 32 "Cape class" ships to move 4ID and its enablers**
- ✓ **Change in ports required change in plan and review of priorities (what equipment, supplies were needed <u>most)</u>**
- ✓ **Requirement for customs / convoy clearances and overflight permission**

ITV

Theater Support Vessel

RE-THINKING ASSUMPTIONS

ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCKS

- ✓ Are the composition and location of APS stocks optimal?
- ✓ Does equipment require "deprocessing" or is it "ready to fight"?
- ✓ Are units and time available for "deprocessing"?
- ✓ What is reconstitution policy?

APS-3 Was The First To Fight Equipment… Should It Be The Best?

UNKNOWNS

- **Resetting the Force**
  - ✓ **Reconstitution (could take up to 12 months; unit dependent)**
  - ✓ **Relocation**
  - ✓ **Modernization**
  - ✓ **Composition**
  - ✓ **Sourcing**
- **Future Composition and Location of APS**
- **Industrial Base (i.e visibility of sub-contracts, surge capacity)**
- **Level of Risk in Spares and Munitions**

/91

192

QC29
20MAY03
CODE H

YARD H
NOW E

/91

FINAL THOUGHT

While there are lessons to be learned from OIF, we shouldn't draw too many conclusions

Can we expect every future conflict to last less than 40 days?

REUTERS

THE ARMY – AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING